Will the gates of hell open after Haniyeh’s death, or do we have to ask Dante again?

by Reza Talebi

The Middle East is on the verge of a new crisis, one that has been developing for years. Severe conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza, unresolved crises like Syria, and the silence regarding the dominance of religious governments in Afghanistan and Iran, combined with the policies of Benjamin Netanyahu, have increased hatred and religious radicalism. Despite considerable efforts, the United States, as a leading global power, has faced challenges in addressing and mitigating these rising tensions. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran could provoke a strong reaction from fundamentalists in Tehran, and with Israel’s possible retaliation, the region may face significant turmoil.

The Middle East once again seems to be on the brink of war. Although I prefer to refer to the region I come from as West Asia, as it better reflects its identity free of colonial implications, it seems that this area is destined for conflict.

After Israel’s assassination of Fuad Shukur, a senior Hezbollah commander in Lebanon, it was expected that Hezbollah would quickly retaliate with attacks on Israel. However, we continue to observe Nasrallah’s silence and lack of response. There may be confusion about the attacks on Majdal Shams and a deep division among the Druze in Lebanon, Israel and Syria that prevents the Druze from uniting against either Israel or Lebanon.[1]

In the midst of this turmoil, following the inauguration of Masoud Pezeshkian as the new president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas’ political wing, was assassinated in Tehran. Haniyeh was living in one of Tehran’s most secure and protected areas, guarded by the Ansar al-Mahdi Corps of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Many were unaware of his exact location. According to Lebanese journalist Elijah Magnier, Haniyeh was tracked by a virus sent via WhatsApp and targeted by a missile after he contacted his son. The building where Haniyeh was present, which also housed Ziad Nakhaleh, the secretary-general of Islamic Jihad, and some Hezbollah members, was precisely destroyed by a Spike missile or a quadcopter. Another important aspect of this incident is that the attack took place on Iranian territory, making it not only an assassination attempt on Ismail Haniyeh and Wasim Shaaban, but also a violation of Iranian sovereignty.

The serious security failures in protecting officials in the heart of Tehran have become a critical vulnerability for Iran. Following the assassinations of Saleh al-Arouri, Qasem Soleimani, Seyyed Razi and Fuad Shukur, and earlier Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, as well as the operation to smuggle nuclear documents out of Iran, the Iranian government has been forced to admit that it has a serious security problem.

Two years ago, former Iranian intelligence minister Ali Younesi declared that the Mossad’s infiltration of the Islamic Republic’s security structure was deep. This was further confirmed by the execution of Mohsen Saravani, who was known to be an adviser to the Supreme Leader’s office, and the dismissal of Taeb as head of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organisation following the organisation’s unsuccessful operation in Istanbul and the arrest of IRGC agents by Mossad agents in the neighbourhoods of Tehran.[2]

All these events took place in the context of the suspicious helicopter crash of former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and the subsequent elections staged by Ayatollah Khamenei’s circle to purify and unify the system. The regime fielded a reformist and pro-leader candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian. Some experts saw this move as an attempt to soften the government’s stance on foreign relations, speed up the resolution of internal problems, especially economic ones, and ease social repression. However, the occurrence of such a significant operation in the heart of Tehran on Pezeshkian’s first day in office complicates the new president’s ability to moderate foreign policy and reopens the field for Islamist radicals and supporters of the Supreme Leader’s doctrine.

Masoud Pezeshkian campaigned on a platform of reform, moderation and justice. Although his rhetoric and the cabinet he has chosen do not yet match these declared slogans, some still hope that he will be able to implement at least some mid-level changes to open up political, social and economic opportunities for the people, alongside the directives of Ayatollah Khamenei. However, he faces a bankrupt government, serious external problems, economic problems, a divide between the people and the government, and human rights pressures on the population and ethnic and religious minorities. Moreover, having started his first statement in the Tehran Times on the subject of Gaza, he probably did not expect to face such a serious crisis so early in his presidency.

The situation escalated as negotiations between Tehran and Washington continued in Muscat, the capital of Oman. Although these talks were interrupted by the death of the former Iranian president, there was hope for a tangible outcome by the time of the US elections. Given the circumstances, however, this hope now depends on the post-election conditions in the United States.

While intense competition between political factions continues within Iran, the hardline faction of supporters of Mesbah-Yazdi and Mirbagheri united around Saeed Jalili is gaining influence. Similarly, internationally, war advocates, conspiracy theorists and supporters of religious radicalism are gaining ground, threatening to plunge both the region and the world into chaos.

These developments could delay the expected moderation of the Supreme Leader’s policies by the Pezeshkian government. If the war in Gaza and the situation in Lebanon escalates, Iran’s economic collapse could escalate into a huge regional conflict with global implications.

Interestingly, while Iran is trying to control Shia religious radicalism, radicalism within Netanyahu’s faction and Iran’s proxies, especially in Yemen and Iraq, is also surging. The Islamic Republic itself needs to manage and contain the groups it has ideologically fed for years. The question is whether it has the will to do so. If we recall former Muslim Brotherhood Secretary-General Hamed Abu Nasr’s meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini, where he later described the relationship with Iran as akin to a necessary but detested relationship with a toilet, we might better understand today’s relationship between Iran and its proxies, including Hamas. The actions of the Netanyahu government have overshadowed the strategic and ideological differences between Iran and its proxies.

The ideological exchange between Khamenei and Netanyahu has intensified, with Netanyahu appearing to hold a strategic advantage. Given Tehran’s severe security weaknesses, Israel has been able to carry out operations with minimal resistance.

Until both Iran and Israel commit to a reasonable two-state solution that grants Palestinians their right to self-determination, the prospects for peace in the Middle East will remain bleak. Over time, both nations have increasingly embraced more radical ideas in their struggle for power. With international law proving ineffective, international organizations remaining weak, and global powers distracted by conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s rising influence, the focus has shifted away from the central issues in Gaza and the Middle East. This diversion is contributing to growing instability in the region, which has the potential to escalate into a localized but significant conflict.

Currently, statements from Tehran suggest a possible retaliatory strike against Israel. If this mirrors the Islamic Republic’s previous operations, the impact may be limited. However, a more decisive response could prompt Israel to target Tehran directly. This situation is unfolding as the Biden administration appears passive and, with upcoming elections, seems to have diminished deterrent power, potentially paving the way for a political shift in the United States. Radicalism in one region can influence and strengthen radical movements in other parts of the world, highlighting the interconnected nature of global politics.

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About the Author

Reza Talebi, with a degree in aerospace engineering, a master’s in international relations and a doctorate in international law and Islamic philosophy from Dublin University, is a journalist who has worked for the BBC, Voice of America, Iran International, Independent and Al Jazeera. He has written and translated 18 books on Iranian political, social and cultural issues. He is currently a PhD candidate in Religious Studies at the University of Leipzig.

Refrences

[1] Fararu. “Published Report.” July 31, 2024. Accessed August 1, 2024.

[2] Younesi, Ali. “Radio Frada report.” Accessed August 1, 2024.

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