Fragile Victory: Can Bangladesh’s Interim Government Avoid the Pitfalls of the Past?

by Julian Kuttig

After at least 400 lives were lost in a student-led revolution, Sheikh Hasina’s autocratic regime collapsed when the military withdrew its support, paving the way for a military-backed interim government led by Nobel laureate Mohammed Yunus, a globally respected and largely neutral figure. International media and social platforms are buzzing with euphoria, celebrating this moment as a democratic victory. However, the road ahead is fraught with challenges. The Awami League’s long-standing dominance was not only due to its authoritarian grip on power, but also to the widespread belief that there was no credible democratic alternative, with the main opposition widely seen as merely another side of the same coin.

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Current events recall the 1991 ouster of military dictator Muhammad Ershad, a movement led by the student wings of the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). This moment, celebrated as Bangladesh’s return to democracy, saw the BNP secure its first term under Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, widow of military ruler Ziaur Rahman, who had taken power after the 1975 assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the country’s liberation leader and Sheikh Hasina’s father. What followed was the infamous “battle of the two Begums,” a bitter rivalry between Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, which shaped a political landscape often described as a party-state or even a violent democracy.

In this system, the ruling party consolidates its power by capturing state institutions and key sectors of the economy and civil society, while the opposition resorts to violent street protests to challenge the government’s grip and maintain a semblance of democracy. This fierce political competition has led to repeated cycles of violence and the periodic imposition of military-backed caretaker governments to oversee elections. Between 1991 and 2014, power alternated between the AL and BNP after every election, a pattern often attributed to deep-rooted anti-incumbent sentiment within society.

The role of History and Challenges for the Interim Government

Understanding the history of Bangladesh’s political dynamics is essential for grasping the challenges now facing the current military-backed interim government, which is not the first of its kind in the country’s political history. After nearly two years under a military-backed caretaker government from 2006 to 2008, established to quell the intense rivalry marked by widespread political violence between the AL and the BNP, the AL won the 2008 elections. The 2014 general election further eroded the public credibility of the BNP opposition, whose longstanding coalition partner, the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami, and its student wing were primarily responsible for orchestrating unprecedented violence against civilians, law enforcement, and minority communities at the time.

This violence was linked to the ongoing war crimes trials targeting mostly Jamaat leaders for their roles in the atrocities of the 1971 Liberation War. While critical to justice, these trials faced criticism from international human rights organizations for being overly politicized. As the interim government navigates this complex landscape, it must confront the AL’s narrative that it is the only viable option, especially given the BNP-Jamaat coalition’s similarly flawed history.

Although there is optimism about the restoration of democracy, the interim government—composed of human rights activists, lawyers, bankers, scholars, and student leaders—faces enormous challenges. The first priority is to restore law and order in a country deeply divided by political strife, with a police force largely recruited from the student wing of the AL. Next, the government must rebuild a bureaucracy that has been thoroughly captured by the Awami League, ensuring that the BNP and Jamaat do not simply fill the void and perpetuate the same party-state dynamics, particularly at the grassroots level. Finally, the organization of credible elections is crucial to securing a legitimate public mandate and ensuring a sustainable democratic future for Bangladesh.

Restoring Law and Order: The Top Priority

A chain of events was triggered by Sheikh Hasina’s abrupt departure for India on August 5 following the military’s decision to withdraw support. Her residence was reportedly looted, monuments and government buildings were ransacked. With police abandoning their posts in fear, AL leaders and workers were left vulnerable to retaliatory violence and killings. The media has been largely remained silent on these incidents, likely due to uncertainty about the future government or possible influence from the military, which may be aiming to stabilize the interim administration.

BNP leaders, including Khaleda Zia, have publicly called for restraint, but insiders acknowledge that grassroots activists from both the BNP and Jamaat—especially those who suffered under AL rule—are settling old scores. The reported violence against Bangladesh’s Hindu minority, about 8% of the population, deserves careful scrutiny. Reuters reported that “a schoolteacher was killed and at least 45 people injured as homes, businesses, and temples of Hindus in Muslim-majority Bangladesh were targeted following Hasina’s resignation,” sparking protests in the capital.

The Awami League, with support from Hindutva-aligned Indian media, has amplified claims of Islamist extremist attacks on Hindus—a narrative previously used to justify AL’s rule as necessary against Islamist forces. However, many of these reports have been debunked. Conversely, allegedly leaked AL messages suggest that targeting Hindu minorities was proposed to further destabilize the interim government. Although Hindus are seen as a reliable AL voting bloc and sometimes as AL leaders or activists, they may have been targeted for revenge. Historically, Hindus have faced violence from both Islamist groups and AL cadres, particularly over land disputes. The identity of the perpetrators and the full extent of the violence remain unclear. In some areas, Muslims have even been active in protecting Hindu temples and homes in their neighborhoods.

For the interim government, restoring law and order is critical to its legitimacy. A significant reshuffling of police leadership has already taken place, and the police are gradually resuming duties. Whether there will be a more thorough purge or prosecutions for the police’s role in the crackdown remains to be seen.

Bureaucratic Overhaul: Easing AL’s Control While Ensuring Administrative Stability

The Yunus-led interim government faces a daunting challenge in reshaping Bangladesh’s deeply entrenched bureaucracy. Initial changes within the police force have been followed by adjustments in the military’s top ranks, and the judiciary is undergoing significant transformation with Syed Refaat Ahmed’s appointment as Chief Justice. The resignations of AL-appointed Vice Chancellors and leadership figures from the University Grants Commission (UGC) signal the beginning of a broader administrative purge that has already spread to the banking and media sectors and is expected to continue across all sectors and levels.

However, the government must proceed cautiously in replacing AL appointees across the administration. In a political system deeply polarized along party lines, finding truly independent candidates for key positions is a daunting task. There’s a risk that BNP or Jamaat sympathizers might fill too many vacancies, potentially undermining efforts to create a more democratic alternative, a key demand of the student movement and reformist groups.

Although the 17-member interim government doesn’t officially include members of the BNP or Jamaat, the backgrounds of at least eight individuals, including the new Chief Justice, suggest possible ties to these parties, either through career paths during the BNP-Jamaat administration or familial connections. This proximity, almost inevitable in Bangladesh’s bipartisan system, may raise concerns. Yet, these individuals, despite or due to their potential affiliations, have been vocal advocates for human rights during nearly two decades of AL rule, making their inclusion somewhat unavoidable.

There are growing fears within the AL that the country could be effectively run by a de facto BNP-Jamaat government under the respected figurehead of Mohammad Yunus even before the elections. However, these concerns must be seen in the context of an AL leadership in disarray after Sheikh Hasina’s surprising departure. As the interim cabinet is expected to expand in the coming months, the composition of the new appointments will likely provide more insight into the direction this government intends to take.

Grassroots politcs: Controlling the power vacuum

The sudden collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s regime has had an immediate and significant impact on the local economy, particularly in food markets, where prices have reportedly plummeted. This dramatic shift has been attributed to the disintegration of local syndicates previously run by AL leaders in collusion with local police and officials. With many AL leaders going into hiding or attempting to flee to India, personal sources suggest that local BNP leaders are moving quickly to fill the power vacuum in an effort to recover from their long-standing economic marginalization. Evidence also indicates that some local goons, or mastans, who once aligned with the AL, have signaled their break from the party by participating in the looting and burning of AL offices.

Those familiar with electoral processes in Bangladesh, or indeed across South Asia, understand the crucial role of grassroots politics and the significance of mobilizing large crowds. Grassroots activists and networks are the lifeblood of political parties. Despite the AL’s repression, Jamaat-e-Islami is believed to have maintained a strong grassroots presence, driven by religious motivation, as demonstrated by recent impressive processions on university campuses. The BNP’s grassroots structure has weakened in recent years due to its leaders’ inability to provide resources to their followers. However, the prospect of regaining power could swiftly revitalize its ranks, a shift already evident in the heightened activities of the party’s student wing as it seeks to fill the power vacuum left by the AL’s student wing. Even though BNP and Jamaat grassroots activists did not initially lead the student movement, their organizational capacity has undoubtedly become instrumental in the movement’s later stages.

The Yunus-led interim government now faces the crucial challenge of addressing these emerging local power structures. A key question is whether the government has the capacity or the will to prevent the reformation of political syndicates that could once again dominate the local economy and campuses. Additionally, the government must consider how the BNP leadership, particularly under Khaleda Zia’s son Tarique Rahman, envisions the future of local party politics. As the upcoming elections approach, the established grassroots networks of the BNP and Jamaat represent a formidable advantage that may be difficult for any emerging political alternatives to match. However, these grassroots leaders will undoubtedly expect something in return for their loyalty.

Elections and the Public Mandate: Timing is Everything.

The timing of the next elections and the tenure of the interim government are key issues in Bangladesh’s political debate. Some advocate for elections within 3-6 months to quickly establish a government with a public mandate, while others suggest that a longer period—up to three or six years—may be needed for significant restructuring of the administration and political system. However, since Yunus is already 84 years old, he’s unlikely to lead an alternative party movement, raising the question of whether these reforms should be undertaken by the military-backed, Yunus-led interim government or a democratically elected administration, which might be more vulnerable to political partisanship.

Building a viable alternative to the entrenched two-party system, especially at the grassroots level, is likely to take more time than a few months. This poses a challenge: rushing to elections could result in a new government that is just as politicized, stalling meaningful reform. On the other hand, delaying elections raises concerns about the interim government’s legitimacy and the risk of prolonged military influence.

Another contentious issue is whether to prosecute AL leaders and police officers responsible for more than 400 deaths and numerous human rights abuses during AL rule should happen under the interim government or leave it to a future elected government. The approach taken will affect not only the outcome, but also where and how these trials may be conducted. The AL government’s handling of international war crimes tribunals serves as a cautionary example of how politicized trials could compromise due process.

Conclusion: A Crossroads for Bangladesh’s Democracy

The key question for Bangladesh is whether the current democratic student uprising will mirror the fleeting impact of the Arab Spring or evolve into a lasting democratic revolution. Can this movement create a viable third alternative capable of breaking the entrenched two-party grip on power? The success of this uprising depends on whether all political actors, including the AL leadership and, crucially, the BNP, can rise above the zero-sum game that has long dominated the country’s political landscape and make a genuine commitment to democracy.

If these actors cannot transcend their rivalries, Bangladesh risks reverting to familiar dynamics, with either a new face of the same political coin or continued military-backed governance. Although groups like the Islamist Jamaat party are likely to wield greater influence in the current interim regime or any future elected government, the alarmist rhetoric from the AL and India about Bangladesh becoming an Islamic fundamentalist state appears exaggerated. The student movement, the interim government, the military, civil society, and even the BNP—whose alliance with Jamaat is seen as strategic rather than ideological—show little interest in supporting such a regime.

As Bangladesh stands at this pivotal crossroads, the choices made by its leaders will determine whether the country can forge a new democratic path or remain trapped in the cycles of its past.

About the Author

Julian Kuttig is a distinguished postdoctoral research fellow at Ghent University’s Department of Conflict and Development Studies, with a focus on the intersection of student politics and authoritarianism in Bangladesh. He has written extensively on topics such as student politics, the role of social media, autocratization, and local leadership formation in Bangladesh. Julian’s PhD dissertation delved into the everyday negotiation of public order in urban Bangladesh, examining the mechanisms and practices of party politics in provincial cities. His research has been published in esteemed international peer-reviewed journals, including “The Journal of Asian Studies,” and in edited volumes by Cambridge and Oxford University Press.